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This thesis is a detailed design of a security kernel
for an archival file storage system. Microprocessor
technology is used to address a major part of the problem
of information security in a distributed computer system.
Utilizing multiprogramming techniques for processor
efficiency, segmentation for controlled sharing, and a
loop-free structure for avoiding intermodule dependencies,
the Archival Storage System is designed for implementation
on the Zilog Z8F01 microprocessor with a memory management
unit. The concepts of a process structure and a
distributed kernel are used in providing management of the
shared hardware resources of the system. The security
kernel primitives create a virtual machine environment and
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This detailed design of a security kernel provides a
basis for implementation of an archival file storage
operating system. The system is intended to store files
for an array of computer hosts at multiple information
security levels. The design presents algorithms and data
structures which can be implemented on microprocessor
hardware available today, to provide economical and secure
storage. Controlled sharing of information and multilevel
security were the key design goals. Multiprogramming is
the technique used to improve efficiency of the system
which is primarily performing input and output operations.
A loop-free structure is used to avoid undesirable
dependency loops [l] . This allows modules to be changed
without introducing changes in other modules.
There are two components of the Archival Storage
System: 1) the Supervisor and 2) the Security Kernel [2].
The Supervisor (the subject of separate research [3])
supports all user services: 1) hierarchical file system,
2) discretionary access controls, and 3) protocols for
communication. The Supervisor operates outside the Kernel
domain on a virtual machine created by the Kernel
primitives. The Supervisor's privilege-restricted domain
has access only to a subset of the machine instructions,
thus needing the Kernel primitives to accomplish tasks
such as input or output.
The Security Kernel described in this thesis manages
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the real resources of the hardware system: 1) memory, 2)
microprocessor, 3) external devices, and 4) input/output
ports. It is also responsible for mediating all
non-discretionary access to information. The Kernel
operates in the most privileged domain of the machine and
therefore has access to all machine instructions.
A. BACKGROUND
Microprocessors have become affordable, prolific, and
powerful computing resources. The result of these
attributes is the use of microprocessors in applications
previously requiring much larger and more expensive
processors. Additionally, new applications which can now
be economically computerized are being seriously explored.
Conversely, software has become more costly.
Microprocessor operating systems and applications programs
continue to be highly specialized, thus failing to
reasonably exploit the potential of the microprocessor.
The specialization of software for microprocessors also
perpetuates problems such as I/O format incompatibilities
which occur when information exchange among processors is
desired.
Information security on microprocessors has been
completely ignored to date, or handled with ad-hoc
attempts at a solution. However, this issue is becoming
increasingly important as the uses of microprocessors
continue to be expanded. For example, the Department of
the Navy is investigating the use of microprocessors on
11

small ships for automating shipboard administrative
functions [4] . Information security for such functions is
a major requirement which cannot presently be met.
Proposing a solution to the above problems, a
high-level design for a secure operating system for
microprocessor-based systems has been outlined by
O'Connell and Bichardson [5]. The design goals of that
operating system were configuration independence,
distributed processing, multiple protection domains,
multiprocessing, and multiprogramming. Because such a
broad, general operating system is not always reauired,
the design provided for a family of operating systems. A
family member could use a subset of functions for a
specific application while allowing later extensions. This




The Archival Storage System can be the nucleus of a
secure, distributed multiprocessor system. It provides
'data warehouse* facilities for multiple host computers in
the network. A host may be operating at a single security
level, or simultaneously at several security levels
without affecting the Archival Storage System. Information
storage with multilevel security is provided for each host
connected to a port of the warehouse. Additionally, the
data warehouse is the mechanism for providing controlled
sharing among the hosts. Thus, we can apply microprocessor
12

technology to address a significant part of the larger
multilevel security problem [6] for distributed systems.
A subset of the O'Connell and Richardson design has
been selected as the basis for the detailed design of the
Archival Storage System. (The subset chosen omits the
provisions for multiprocessors, dynamic linking, demand
segmentation, "transient" processes, and a user domain.)
The Supervisor, protocols, and interfaces to the host
computers are presented in a parallel thesis by Parks [3]
while detailed design of the Security Kernel is presented
in this thesis.
There are two components of the Archival Storage
System Security Kernel which reside in the privileged
domain of the machine: l)the distributed kernel and 2) the
kernel processes. From a logical view, some kernel
procedures are distributed among all the Supervisor
processes in the system, with the remaining procedures
forming kernel processes. These kernel processes perform
functions that are asynchronous to the supervisor
processes and are responsible for the shared resources of
the system (processes, processor, memory, input/output).
1 . Definition of a Process
A sequential process can be conceptualized as an
execution point and an address space which is a logical
rather than physical entity. All procedures that are in
the flow (or locus) of control are in the address space.
In a distributed operating system, the locus of execution
13

includes those operating system functions which are
logically part of the user process. The distributed
operating system is divided into procedures which are
called in normal fashion, hut are located in the
privileged domain.
2. Multiple Protection Domains
One requirement for design of a security kernel is
isolation of the kernel procedures to make them
tamperproof. A way this can be achieved is to arrange the
process address space into hardware or software protection
domains. Domains need not be hierarchical, but in this
case they are. Hierarchical domains are commonly called
protection rings [?] .
3ach level in the hierarchy is more privileged
than the preceding level. In the Archival Storage System
only two domains are necessary. Other levels must be added
to protect the Supervisor if the design is extended to
include user applications. The distributed Kernel resiles
in the most privileged domain and may access any segment
within the address space of a process. All systemwide
databases are in the kernel domain. Violation of the
confinement principle described by Lampson [9] and Lipner
[9] would occur if such information could be passed to
other domains.
ThP Supervisor operates in the outer or least
privileged protection domain where access to segments ani
external devices is restricted. Only those databases which
14

are 'process local" may be accessed. This does not prevent;
sharing since different segment numbers and access rights
for each process can be interpreted and enforced by the
kernel. Each Supervisor process is required to remain at a
specified security level within its domain.
Protection domains may be created by either
hardware or software. Software implementations of
protection domains (as in the early Multics [10]) are
feasible, but result in a degradation of efficiency. This
performance loss is unacceptable in many applications. In
large processors a hardware ring mechanism is sometimes
used to provide the implementation [7] . This general ring
mechanism is not available in current microprocessors, but
two domain machines are available. When supplemented by
ring-crossing software, this will provide the desired
multiple domains.
3 . Segmentation
A segment is defined as a logical grouping of
information [11], while segmentation is a technique for
managing segments within an address space. A process's
address space consists of a collection of procedures and
data segments. All address specifications require the
segment specification and the offset within the segment
(i.e., a two-dimensional address). Segments are therefore
distinctly visible to the user. Unlike pages, segments are
arbitrarily sized and logical units with logical
attributes to d°scribe them.
15

Attributes of segments are contained in a
structure called a segment descriptor. The descriptor
associates segments with address in memory, size, and
access allowed. Maintaining all of the descriptors of the
segments of a process in a descriptor list allows the
address space of the process to he easily managed.
Segmentation offers benefits as a memory
management scheme. The key advantage is the ability of
multiple processes to share segments without the
requirement of maintaining multiple copies in memory.
Cther favorable characteristics of segmentation are
control of memory waste due to fragmentation, creation of
user virtual memory, dynamic linking of modules, and
enforcement of controlled segment access.
Segmentation eliminates the need to duplicate a
segment when shared. Having only one copy saves memory and
eliminates the problem of conflicting data which occurs
when multiple copies are maintained. Even more central to
segmentation is the ability of cooperating processes to
communicate with each other through shared segments.
Inter-process synchronization and communication are
necessary functions in a multiprogramming environment.
4. Information Security
Most users of computer systems are required to
safeguard information from unauthorized access. Examples
abound: government (classified information), corporations
(trade secrets), banking (electronic funds transfer), and
16

all users of personal data (privacy act). This reauirement
is not relaxed when microprocessors are used instead of
(or in support of) large computer systems. Dedicating a
device to a specific security level (dedicated mode) [6]
is a method commonly used to meet the security
requirement. This solution is unsatisfactory for any user
with a reauirement to utilize data at more than one access
class .
Another solution to the problem of accessing
information at different security levels is to operate in
the multilevel mode. In this case both users and
information at different security classes exist
simultaneously on the same computer system. Users are not
permitted to access information unless authorized by the
security policy in effect.
In the dedicated mode all security measures are
external to the computer system (e.g., perimeter fencing,
guards, door locks, etc.). When a multilevel mode
environment is used, controls must be internal as well as
external. Attempts at internal controls have been tried by
adding security measures to existing systems with
unsatisfactory results. Numerous cases are documented of
penetrations (i.e., unauthorized access) of these systems
[6]. Intuition rather than sound design was the
methodology used in these unsuccessful attempts at
securi ty
.
Internal controls nust be designed into a system
17

from its conception. The approach to designing these
controls is the security kernel methodology . The first
step using the security kernel methodology is to define
the security requirements. From this definition a
conceptual design is created. The conceptual design is
actually a mathematical model which can be rigorously
proven and provides the basis for testing (certifying) [2]
all subsequent implementations.
Three things are reauisite before a system can be
secure using the security kernel concept: 1) The kernel
must be isolated cr tamperproof. Obviously if a penetrator
can change the kernel software, then the behavior of the
kernel can be modified. 2) The kernel must be invoked on
every attempt to access information. This requirement can
be met by initial software interpretation of access on the
first call to a segment. Thereafter, hardware can enforce
the access criteria. 3) The kernel must be subject to
certification. Proof of the mathematical model must be
followed by thorough testing of the implementation to
insure that each input yields the desired output. Since
hardware and software are involved, both must be tested
before the kernel car. be certified.
As previously stated, the first step in the design
of the secure computer system is to define the security
requirements. A properly designed computer system is then
secure with respect to that definition or policy. A
security policy consists of the external laws, rules, and
18

regulations that establish what access is to be permitted.
Two distinct types of security policy exist: 1)
non-discretionary and 2) discretionary.
Non-discretionary policy involves comparing the
requested (i.e., the information object's) access class
(oac) with the access class of the requestor (i.e., the
subject) (sac) to insure that they are compatible. For
example, in the Department of Defense security policy a
secret cleared individual (subject) may have access to
documents (objects) which are classified as secret,
confidential, or unclassified.
The relationships between different access classes
can be represented by a lattice structure [12]. This
lattice structure is totally ordered if all classes are
related. When the classes are either related or disjoint
the lattice is partially ordered. The lattice structure
interprets the authorized access based on the
relationships between two labels. The lattice structure
abstraction is important because it seems to represent
most practical security policies. By changing the
interpretation of labels in the non-discretionary security
module, a different policy can be implemented so that, for
example, Privacy Act requirements are as enforceable as
Department of Defense security policies.
The following interpretation defines the access
permitted in a computer system (where "% is defined to
mean unrelated) in terms of subject access class (sac) and
19

object access class (oac):
sac = oac, read/write permitted
sac > oac , read permitted (read down)
sac < oac, write permitted (write up)
sac % oac, no access
DOD security policy is represented by a partially ordered
lattice since security classifications are composed of a
classification level and a category (e.g., secret,
cryptographic or confidential, nuclear).
Discretionary controls provide a refinement of the
non-discretionary access. A common example of
discretionary controls involves checking an access control
list before allowing an access. This allows authorized
subjects ; users) to specify who may use that segment
within the confines of the non-discretionary policy. The
DOD "need-to-know" rule is an example of discretionary
policy. In the Archival Storage System non-discretionary
policy is enforced by the Supervisor, based on both the
host and the user.
C. STRUCTURE CF TEE THESIS
This thesis presents the detailed design of a portion
of the security kernel for an archival file storage
facility (distributed kernel procedures and memory manager
process). Levels of abstraction are used to reduce the
complexity of the hierarchical Archival Storage System.
Level 2 contains the Supervisor and operates in the
virtual environment created by the Kernel. The Supervisor
20

does not control the hardware of the system but applies
the hardware resources only by appealing to the functions
of the Kernel. Calls to procedures at different levels may
only be made in a downward direction and corresponding
returns only in an upward direction (i.e., the Kernel ^ay
not call upon the Supervisor to accomplish any task). This
restriction, rigidly enforced at all levels of abstraction
in the design, reduces the number and type of interactions
of the system.
Figure 1 shows the process structure of the system
with the distributed and non-distributed kernel. The
asynchronous Memory Manager and I/O Manager are kernel
processes. The remaining kernel procedures are distributed
in all the supervisor processes.
In the next chapter the details of the design are
presented. Although this is not an implementation, the
Zilog ZS001 Microprocessor [13] with the Z6010 MMU Memory
Management Unit is used as the hardware base for this
research. Choices made during the design process were
often influenced by the hardware features available. The
Z6000 family of devices is not mandatory for implementing
the Archival Storage System. Cther microprocessors exist
which are capable of supporting a secure system.
Algorithms and data structures are presented in the
high level language PLZ/SY5 [14] . PLZ/SY5 is a
Pascal-like, block-structured language. Designed by Zilog,





Figure 1. Process View
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PLZ/ASM [15] is used where machine level instructions for
direct hardware manipulation are required. These two
languages for the Z8000 are used because of the capability
of linking modules of either language to the other.
Additionally, PLZ/ASM has the same high level data
structures and structured control mechanisms present in
PLZ/SYS.
The conclusions reached during this research are
presented in the last chapter. Topics for further research
and implementation are identified, including those in the
area of secure systems. With this multilevel data-store, a
secure distributed microprocessor system can be
implemented using communications lines to interface







Theoretically any processor hardware is usable for
secure computer systems. However, in practice certain
hardware features are essential for efficiency. In
addition, complexity of the software portion of the
security kernel is highly dependent upon the capabilities
of the hardware. Because simplification of the kernel
results in an easier proof of correctness, it is
worthwhile to use additional hardware to achieve security.
One essential hardware feature is a segmentation
mechanism. Segmentation allows the use of one uniform type
of information object, the segment. Kernel software which
deals with logical objects is then simplified. Paging
hardware without segmentation does not provide a correct
structure for objects, since pages are physical objects
with physical attributes. For example, an access risht is
a logical attribute. Applying an access right to a
physical object ''as is the case for ISM 370 protection
"locks" [11]) obscures the purpose of the attribute, is
out of context, and adds complexity to the supporting
mechanism .
A segment address consists of a segment name and an
offset within the segment. This logical address must be
transformed into an absolute address before it can be
used. While software is capable of making this
transformation, hardware can perform the mapping more
24

efficiently and simultaneously check access while doing
the mapping.
Multiple execution domains are also considered
essential in hardware. This feature is used in current
computer systems to protect the operating system from
applications programs, hut until recently this feature has
not been available in microprocessor hardware. In the
initial Archival Storage System implementation only two
domains are necessary since applications programs do not
exist inside the boundaries of the system. Protecting the
Kernel from the Supervisor is the only domain protection
required. If user utilities are added to the design, then
another domain will be necessary to protect the Supervisor
from user tampering.
With the introduction of Zilog's ZS000, the above
hardware features are available in the microprocessor
category. The design of the Archival Storage System is
targeted toward a hardware system based upon the 28001
segmented microprocessor [16] and the ZS010 MMU Memory
Management Unit [17]. The ZS001 is a 16-bit two-domain
microprocessor which produces a 23-bit segmented address.
The ZS010 MMU maps the 23-bit logical address into a
24-bit absolute address and allows the capability of
addressing up to 128 segments of 64K bytes each in the
two-dimensional memory space.
In addition to the address mapping hardware, the MMU
also provides memory access protection. Segment access may
25

be set to write (read implied), read, or execute only.
When an unauthorized access is attempted, the MMU prevents
the access, then sends a trap (or fault) signal to the
microprocessor. A trap is an internal interrupt which is
synchronous rather than asynchronous to the cycling of the
processor and must he resolved by the processor before
processing can continue.
The microprocessor also supports two protection
domains. The MMU provides the implementation of two
hardware rings by checking for system or user status on
each access to a segment. The bit in the MMU which
specifies system or normal mode, thus specifies which
segments are accessible in just the Kernel ring and which
segments are also accessible in the Supervisor ring. Thus
a process must cross into the Kernel ring to access the
Kernel primitives. If more than two rings are required, an
additional MMU (up to eight total) may be employed per
ring.
The hardware also supports resource control by
limiting the use of certain machine instructions. In the
system mode all machine instructions can be executed. When
in user mode, the hardware will not allow the use of
input/output instructions, certain machine control
instructions, or special input/output instructions (used
to load and control the MMU). Thus the Kernel can control




Hardware features other than those described above are
indicated from a performance standpoint. For instance, a
direct memory access (DMA) device could make memory to
memory, memory to port, or port to memory transfers faster
than similar transfers under direct CPU control. This
would allow the CPU to continue with other tasks while the
DMA is processing the data transfers. Protection of memory
can still be realized by routing the DMA through the MMU.
The DMA would have to be "smart" enough to handle an
access violation trap or the Kernel would have to
guarantee, by MMU set-up, that the DMA would not violate
the security policy. This type of hardware is not crucial
to the design at this level, and the decision on its use
is left to the implementor.
The MMU does lack a descriptor base register
capability [10]. Process switches without this facility
require at least selective unloading and loading of the
descriptor registers in the MMU, and a process switch
would take roughly two (2) milliseconds to accomplish in
this manner. It is evident that process switching may lead
to thrashing problems if done too often. There are ways
the implementor might avoid this problem (e.g., dedicating
an MMU to each process, then switching MMUs rather than
loading/unloading a single MMU).
3. PROPOSED K2PNEL DESIGM
1 . Notation
Notation is important in making algorithms
2?

understandable. It should not, however, require more
thought to understand the notation than the central
concept. Since this thesis presents a detailed design, a
notation as close as possible to an actual language which
can compile to ZS000 machine code was desired. PLZ
languages are used as a notation to illustrate the data
structures and procedures. However, the code as shown in
the figures cannot be directly implemented. Among other
changes, procedure order has been rearranged to make
explanation of the modules more logical. This change would
violate a PLZ/SYS implementation rule that procedures must
be declared before they can be invoked.
The details of the actual PLZ/SYS language
implementation may be different from that assumed in this
thesis. In particular, the specific method of parameter
passing between PLZ/ASM and PLZ/SYS is unknown at this
time. The implementor should carefully investigate how
passing of parameters in the actual language
implementation affects the interfaces between modules.
Because of the terminology used in the ZS000
Microprocessor specifications, the Supervisor may be
referred to as operating in the normal or user mode.
the term system mode is used, it refers to the Kernel
domain of execution.
2 . Kernel Overview
The distributed Kernel modules exist on three


























Figure 2. Hierarchical View
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of abstraction [191. At level 1 or the innermost level is
the Inner_Traf f ic_Controller . Its primary task: is the
control of virtual processors and the multiplexing of
virtual processors onto the real processor. The
Inner_Traf
f
ic_Controller uses the Virtual Processor Table
as a management tool for this multiplexing of virtual
processors .
At level 2 is the Traf f ic_Controller . The
Traf
f
ic_Controller creates the sequential process
abstraction [17]. A process can be in one of two states:
1) blocked or 2) unblocked. When blocked, it must wait for
the occurrence of some event. Since the process cannot
proceed until that event occurs, the virtual processor is
freed and then allocated to another process. When
unblocked a process is either ready or running. In the
ready state, the process can run when a virtual processor
is assigned to it. The readv state can be entered from
either the running or blocked state (figure 3).
The Non_Discretionary_Securi ty Module is also on
level 2. This module is charged with interpretation of the
security policy in effect. It compares the two labels
which are passed to it and determines the relationship of
the labels based on a lattice structure known to the
module. This relationship is then used by the kernel to
determine authorized access to objects (segments or
parts). It is emphasized that the Kernel makes decisions














figure 3. Process States
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and not on the labels themselves. The
Non_Discretionary_Security Module is the only module in
the Kernel which makes any interpretation of security
labels. This allows most of the practical security
policies to be implemented simply by changing the
Non_Discretionary_Security Module.
At level 3 is the Segment_Manager . Using the MMU
mapping to real memory provided by the hardware, the
5egment_Manager creates a segmented virtual memory for the
process. Because of the limitations of the hardware (lack
of a paging mechanism), segments are not dynamically
allocated real memory. The size of a reauested segment is
fixed (or determined) at the time it is created and may
not change. The Supervisor has several options in order to
handle the problem of growing segment size: 1) Allocate
the maximum size to every segment which is wasteful of
memory, 2) copy the segment into a larger segment whenever
the size changes which is wasteful of processor cycles, 3)
create a "super-segment" as a collection of segments, or
4) some combination of the above. 3y requiring the
Supervisor to handle this problem, the initial Kernel
implementation is simpler.
The whole segment must be swapped into main memory
in order to be used. The MMU supports segments ranging In
size from 256 bytes to 64K bytes in multiples of 256
bytes. Additionally, the hardware forces another
constraint on the design. Without paging, two allocation
32

schemes are available to the designer: 1) a demand
segmentation memory management scheme (load the segment Lo
response to a fault) or 2) a partitioned allocation
scheme. In this design a partitioned allocation scheme is
used to make the Kernel less complex. Part of the burden
of memory management is then forced on the Supervisor. The
Supervisor of each process is given a fixed amount of
linear "virtual core*. Linear 'virtual core* is
distinguished from the two-dimensional virtual memory
created by the segmentation. The Supervisor, by requests
to the Kernel, may fill virtual core with segments as it
chooses. The Supervisor of each process must manage its
own virtual core and fit any segments it uses within the
boundaries of this virtual core. The partitioned
allocation portion of the memory management scheme is
supported by the Memory_Manager process of the
non-distributed Kernel.
The non-distributed portion of the Kernel resides
in two kernel processes: 1) Memory_Manager and 2)
I/0_Manager. These two processes are responsible for
actions which are not logically part of the supervisor
processes because they can function asynchronously to the
processes. The Memory_Manager moves segments within the
physical memory space of the system. These transfers may
be main memory to main memory, mam memory to secondary
storage, or secondary storage to main memory. Main memory
to main memory drives are made because of a design decision
33

to restrict sharing of the same copy of a segment unless
at least one of the sharing processes has write permission
to the segment. Whenever two processes share a segment and
neither has write access, two copies of the segment will
exist—one in each virtual processor local memory. This
trade-off results in less complexity in the kernel and
when the design is expanded to a multiprocessor
implementation, bus contention is minimized [5]. The
problems associated with the existence of multiple copies
in memory are not present since the segment is not
wr i teable .
Whenever a segment is to be shared and is
writeable, then the segment must be moved to the real
processor global memory. Movement of the segment is easily
accomplished by updating the appropriate MMUs to reflect
the new location of the segment. This concept of a process
local and global memory is analogous to processor local
and global memories in multiprocessor systems. In those
systems, each real processor owns a local memory, while
the system controls the global memory used by all
processors for shared information.
The I/0_Manager is responsible for routing
segments across the system boundary, viz., moving data
between external ports of the system and main memory. The
I/0_Manager does not try to interpret the data, tut simply
provides a transfer service. All the ports have specific
security classifications and are hard-wired. This allows
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the I/0_Manager to function without requiring labels or
other security mechanisms to determine access class.
Having all Hosts at a fixed security level is a design
choice for the .Archival Storage System. Hosts can be at
multiple levels if the design is modified to accept
"trusted" labels. In the present design the Host computer
is required to be at the level of the port and to handle
data consistent with the security policy in effect.
Since the hardware does not completely support the
ring structure, software (Gate_Keeper ) is needed for the
ring-crossing mechanism and thus isolation of the Kernel.
All calls to the distributed Kernel and interprocess
communication with the non-distributed Kernel from the
Supervisor must pass through the Gate_Keeper. The function
of the Gate_Keeper is to provide the sole entry point or
gate into the Kernel ring, validate the call and
arguments, and transfer the call to the appropriate kernel
module. If a call is made incorrectly the Gate_Keeper sets
a return message to an error code, and returns without
further action. The Gate_Keeper is the ring-crossing
mechanism of the Archival Storage System.
3. Gate Keeper Module
The Gate_Keeper Module (shown in Appendix A rather
than as a figure because of its length) consists of
procedures and primary data structures and is the sole
entry point into the Kernel from the Supervisor. The
Gate_Keeper Module is written in PLZ/ASM since it is a
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trap handler. (The user registers must be saved when the
handler is invoked which requires access to the hardware.;
When the Supervisor wishes to invoice the Kernel it must
put the argument list and space for any return message in
a segment with read/write access in the Supervisor ring.
When the system call is made, the pointer to the arguments
is required to he in a double register. The system call
instruction is then executed, with the function-code for
the requested Kernel procedure as a parameter within the
instruction. This causes the machine to save the program
counter, flags and control word, and the instruction
itself on the system (kernel) stack. An unconditional jump
(hardware initiated) is then made to the Program Status
Area (a vector table) (figure 4) where the machine state
for the system call instruction is fetched. The Program
Status Area is established at system generation and
consists of "frames" which contain the machine state and
location of the interrupt and trap handlers. The processor
then begins execution in the Kernel ring.
The Gate_Keeper first saves the user processor
registers and retrieves the pointer to the argument list.
If the argument list is located in a read/write segment of
the calling 'Supervisor) ring, a copy of the argument list
is put onto the system stack. However, if ae area
indicated by the calling ring is not in the read/write
address space of the process, the Gate_Keeper will not


























Figure 4. Program Status Area
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The Gate_Keeper restores the user environment and makes a
normal return.
The Gate_Keeper uses a table (figure 5) to check
the range of the function code. If the 3ate_Keeper cow
discovers an error during the validation process, it sets
the return message to an error code, copies the argument
list hack: to the user area, and returns in the usual way.
If the call is valid, the Gate_Keeper calls the
appropriate module (e.g., Segment_Manager ) at the
requested entry point into the module.
When the module has completed the requested task
it returns to the Sate_Keeper . The return message is then
copied to the user's return argument, and a return to the
user ring occurs. All entries into and exits from the
Kernel are through the Gate_Keeper.
Parameter passing to and from the Kernel is by
value only. Since implementation details of how ?LZ
modules pass parameters are unknown, the decision on the
precise mechanism for argument passing is left for the
implementor. It may he best to align the method of
parameter passing as closely as possible to the method
used by the PLZ/STS language.
4 . Segment Manager Module
The Segment_Manager is responsible for managing
the segmented physical memory and uses the
Known_Segment_Table (5ST) as its primary datatase. In
























Figure 5. Parameter Table
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Segment_Manager is the only module at level 3 of the
Kernel, only calls external to the Kernel domain may be
made to the Segment_Manager
. There are six entries into







a. Known Segment Table
The data structure used by the 3egment_tfanager
to manage segments is the Known Segment Table (EST). The
KST is a "process local" data structure and contains an
entry for each segment which the process has declared an
intention to use (viz., "made-known"). The segments may or
may not be located in main memory. If a sesment has an
entry in the KST, then the segment is described as known
to the process. In this design it will also nave an entry
in the Active Segment Table (AST— a Memory_^anager
database explained later) and can be described as active.
The KST (figure 5) is indexed by the segment numbers
(Segment_#) which are assigned by the Segment_.v,anager . Tne
Segment_* also corresponds to the MMU descriptor register
for the segment. The ASTE_# is the Active Segment Ta':lr
entry number and is obtained from the ^emo ry_Manager . The
ASTE_# is the "handle" which is passed to
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Memory_Manager when necessary to identify a particular
active segment. The Size field is an integer which is the
size of the segnent in bytes divided by 256. All segments
are created in multiples of 256 bytes because of MMU
constraints. An upper bound ( Max_Segment_S ize) is placed
on the segment Size by the design (explained later). A
flag known as In_Core is used to indicate whether the
segment is in main memory or on secondary storage.
The last field in the KST entry is the access
class of the segment. This is a label which indicates the
security classification of the segment. Interpretation of
the Class to determine an access mode (read or read/write)
is performed by the software (by a call to
Non_Discretionary_Security ) on first reference; thereafter
the access mode is enforced by the MMU.
Figure 6 shows both the logical view and the
PLZ variable declaration for the KST. Max_KST_Size is
hardware dependent and is equal to the maximum number of
segments which can be mapped by the MMU. To access an
element of the database the following notation is used:
KST [Segment_#]. ASTE_#
If Segment_# is equal to 103 then the above statement will
reference the ASTH_* field of the KST entry fcr segment
number 103.
b. Creation and Deletion of Segments
Create_Segment and Delete_Segment are two of









Known Segment Table Logical View
Type





Internal ! Internal to the Sesmer t_Manager !
KST Array [MaT_KST_S ize KST_Entry]
Known Segment Table Database Definition
Figure 6. Known Segment Table
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Create_Segment (figure 7) is the function which adds a new
segment to the Archival Storage System after validating
the parameters which are passed. The creation of a segment
is accomplished by requesting the Memory_Manager process
to make an entry in the Alias Table and to allocate
storage on secondary media.
The Alias Table is a database which is
maintained by the Memory_Manager . It is a result of the
aliasing scheme used by the kernel to prevent passing
systemwide information (such as the unique identification
of a segment) out of the Kernel [20]. The alias of a
segment is the segment number of a "mentor" segment (a
process local variable) and the entry number in the
Alias_Table. The principal implication of the aliasing
scheme is that a mentor segment must be known before a
segment can be created. The Alias Table will be further
explained in a succeeding section.
The arguments which must be passed to
Create_Segment are the Men tcr_Segment_- , the desired
2ntry_# (in the Alias_Table ) , the Class of the segment (a
label), and the desired Size of the segment. The KST is
searched to insure that the Mentor segment is known. Next,
Non_Discretionary_Secur ity must be called to determine if
the segment is compatible [2]. (To be compatible, a mentor
segment classification must be less than or equal to the
created segment.) The compatibility chec* can be performed
in the Segment Manager or the Memory Manager. In addition
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If KST[Mentor_Segment_#") .ASTE_# = Null





KST [Mentor_Segment_#] .Class) O Equal
Then Success_Code := Not_Alloved
Exi t
Fi
Compat_Check := Non_Disc_Security( Class
,
KST[Mentor_Segment_#] .Class)
If Com?at_Check = Less_Than
Orif Compat_Check: = Not_Related
Then Success_Code := Not_Compati hie
Exit
Fi
If Size > Max_Segment_Size









Figure 7. Create_Segment Procedure
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to the compatibility check:, a check must be made to
determine if the process access class is equal to the
access class of the Alias_Table since adding an entry
implies write permission to the Alias_Table. A check is
then made on the Size parameter to insure that it is in
the range of 256 bytes to 32K bytes. The maximum size of a
segment is determined by the size of the design of the
secondary storage page table and the hardware constrains
the segment to multiples of 256.
If an error is discovered luring any of the
preceding checks, then an appropriate error code is
returned (e.g., Parent_Segment_Not_Found) . If tnere are no
errors, the Segnent_Manager Signals the Memory_ v!anager
with a request to make an entry in the Alias_Table. The
Segment_Manager must Wait for a success code from tne
Memory_Manager since the Entry_# can only be checked for a
duplication by the Memory_Manager . When the Memory_ Manager
Signals the Se<?ment_Manager that the task has been
completed, the Segment_Manager returns the Success_Code to
the process. Note that the segment has only been created
and if the Supervisor now wishes to reference the segment
it must first request the segment be entered into the KST
(Make_Known)
.
Delete_Segment (figure 8) accomplishes the
reverse of Create_Segment , that is the removal c*: ?.
directory entry. The two input parameters
Delete_Segment are Mentor_Segment_* and Intry_ 3 . Again,
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If KST[Mentor_Segment_#] .ASTE_# = Null





KST[Mentor_Segment_#] .Class ) = Equal
Then Signal (Memory Manager .Delete Entry,
KST [Mentor_3egment_#]7ASTZ_#,Entry_*)
Success_Code := Wait




Figure 8. Delete_Segent Procedure
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the mentor segment must be known before the
Segment_Manager can honor the request. Since the mentor
segment must be known, compatibility was checked when the
segment was created. The process access class must also ^e
equal to the access class of the mentor segment since
deleting an entry Implies write permission. When all
security checks have been made, the 3egment_Manager
Signals the Memory_Manager to delete the entry from the
Alias_Table. The Segment_Manager Waits for the
Memory_Manage r to complete the task and it returns the
Success_Code from the Memory_Manager to the Supervisor
process. The Wait is necessary because an error occurs if
the Mentor_Segment is not empty prior to the deletion,
c. Managing the Segmented Address Space
A process must declare an intention to use a
segment before it can reference the segment. This
declaration introduces the segment into the address space
of the process. The way the Supervisor declares its
intention to use a segment is to ask that a Segment_# be
assigned. This results in an entry in the
Known_Segment_Table . Make_Enown is the entry point into
the Segment_Manager tc accomplish an entry in the SST.
A call to Make_Known (figure 9) requires three
parameters: 1) Ment cr_Segment_# f 2) 3ntry_*, and
Access_Mode_Desi red . Seg^ent_# is the value which the
Segment_Manager returns to the Supervisor process and is
the index to the KST entry and to the segment descriptor
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Make Known Procedure ( Mentor_Segment_# Integer
Entry_#""lnteger





























t_#] .ASTE# = Null
Mentor _Not_Known
Manager , Activate,
Segment_#] . ASTE_# ,Sntry_*)
e, Success_Code~:= Wait
Segment_Found
KST [Index] .ASTE_# = ASTE_#





















If KST [Index] .ASTE_# = Null











Else Access_Mode_Allowed := Read
Fi
?i
If Access_Mode_Allowed <> Null
Then Segment_# := Index
KSTTSegment #] .ASTE # := ASTE_#
KST[Segment~#] .Class := Class
EST[Segment_#] . Access_Mode :=
Access Mode_Allowed
KST[Segment_#] .Size := Size












If Index > Max_Number_Of_Segments







Figure 9. Make_Known Procedure (Continued)
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in the MMU hardware. Different processes using the same
segment will not have the same 5egment_# for the segment,
since each process has its own KST. Three parameters are
returned from Make_Known: 1) the assigned Segment_#, 2)
the Access_Mode_Allowed which may be less than
Access_Mode_Requested, and 3) a Success_Code. If the
Success_Code indicates an error the first two parameters
are Null.
Make_Known first Signals the Memory_Manager
and Waits for the ASTE_# of the segment. If more than two
rings were implemented, ring brackets would also be
required from the Memory_Manager [10]. A search of the KST
then will reveal if the segment is already known. If it is
known, the assigned Segment_# the Access_Mode_Allowed
(unchanged), and a Success_Code of Already_Known are
returned. Access_Mode_Allowed cannot be changed for
segments in the address space. If there is no entry in the
KST, an entry is made by filling in the columns of the KST
at the first available Segment_~.
Non_Discretionary_Security is called to interpret the
security labels of the subject and the object. Access to
the segment is then granted with the access allowed eaual
to the less privileged of Access_Mode_Desired or
Max_Access_Allowable . If write access is requested but
security allows only read, read is the access granted. A
call must also be made to the Inner_Traf f ic_Controlle r
add the segment descriptor to the hardware descriptor list
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(MMU) and the software image of the descriptor list.
If the maximum number of segments is exceeded
Make_Known will return No_Segmen t_Available. The process
then has the option of terminating any other segment to
make room for the required segment. (Note that the maximum
number of segments allowed by the hardware could be
exceeded without using all of the linear "virtual core"
allocation or conversely.) Terminate is the entry point in
the Segment_Manager to remove a segment from the KST.
Terminate (figure 10) is responsible for
removing the segment frcm the address space and reflects
this by removing the entry from the K5T . The only argument
which must be passed is the Segment_* to be terminated.
The return argument is a Success_Code . There are four
errors which can be found by the Segment_Manager : 1) a
segment which is not known, 2) attempting to terminate a
segment still loaded in the process virtual core, 3)
attempting to terminate a Kernel segment, and 4) passing
an invalid Segment_* (too large). The Menory_Manager is
Signaled to Deactivate the segment (remove the AST entry)
and a Wait occurs until the Deactivate is completed. Note
that the Wait is to insure that a race condition between
the Memory_Manager and Supervisor process [11] does not
occur. The KST entry is deleted by setting the AST_* of
the KST entry to null, calling the
Inner_Traff ic_Controller to delete the segment from the
descriptor segment and returning.
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If KST[Segment_#] ,ASTE_# = Null
Then Success Code := Segment Mot Known
Siit
Pi
If KST[Segment_#] .In_Core = Yes
Then Success_Code := Segment_In Core
Exit
Fi
If Segment_# <= Number_Iernel_Segments
Then Success Code := Kernel_Segment
Exit
Fi
If Segment_# > Max_Segment_#
Then Success Code 7= Invalid_Segment_#
Exit
Fi
Signal(Memory_Manager,Deactivate,KST [Segment _#] .ASTE_#)
Success_Code := Wait
KST[Segment_#] .ASTE_# := Null
Inner TC( Delete S eg ,Segment_#)
Od
End Terminate
Figure 10. Terminate Procedure
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d. Moving Segments into Memory
Swap_In (figure 11) and Swap_Gut (figure 12)
are the two procedures in the Segment_Manager which move
segments between main memory and secondary storage.
(Secondary storage is used as a generic term in this
thesis to indicate all memory of a computer system other
than main or core memory. It includes "tertiary" or lower
order memory.) To move a segment from secondary storage to
main memory, a process must call 5wap_In with tne
Segment_# and 3ase_Address as arguments. 3ase_Address is
the location in the linear virtual core of the process
where the segment is to begin. This is a virtual core
address and does not correspond to a real address in
memory; in fact, memory cannot be addressed at all except
by addressing a segment. The Segment_Manager indexes to
the segment in the KST to retrieve the necessary
attributes for moving the segment. If the segment is not
found, Segment_Nct_?ound is returned. After obtaining the
attributes of the segment, the Segment_Manager Signals the
Memory_Manager to do the transfer. A Wait is then executed
until the Memory_Manager can send the Absolute_Address In
real memory to the Segment ^Manager . This information is
passed to the Inner_Traf
f
ic_Controller to update the
absolute address in the hardware and software descriptor
lists. This procedure only works because of the design
choice not to unload a process from a virtual processor.
If processes are unloaded the Memcry_Manager would have to
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Swap_In Procedure (Segment_# Integer
3ase_Address Word)
Returns ( Success_Code Integer)
Entry
If XST[Segment_#] .ASTE_# = Null










Absolute_Address ,Success_Code := Wait
If Success_Code = Swapped_In
Then Inner TC (Load, Segment # ,Absolute_Address
,
KST [Segmental. Size)
KST[Segment #].In_Core := Tes
Fi
End Swap_In
Figure 11. Swap_In Procedure
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Swap_Out Procedure (Segment_# Integer)
Returns (Succe ss_Code Integer)
Entry
If KST [Segment _#] .ASTE # = Null
Then Success_Code := Seg_Not_Found
Exit
Fi
Written := Inner_TC (Unload ,Segment_# )
Signal ( Memo ry_Manager, Out ,KST [Segment _*1 .ASTE_#, Wri tten)
KST[Segment_#] .In_Core := No
Success Code := Swapped_Out
End Swap_0ut
Figure 12. Swap_0ut Procedure
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call the Inner_Traff ic_Controller. The parameter returned
to the process indicates if the segment swap-in was
successful.
The move in the other direction—mam memory
to secondary storage—is performed by Swap_0ut. The only
input argument is the Segment_# and Success_Code is the
only return argument. After validation of the 5egment_#,
the Segment_Manager calls the Inner_Traf f
i
c_Controller to
obtain the status of the hardware changed bit. This is in
turn passed by Signal to the Memory_Manager to make the
change. Success_Code is set to Swap_0ut and the
Segment_Manager returns. If more than one processor is
used in the system, race conditions should be investigated
in this procedure of allowing the Segment_Manager rather
than the t*emory_Manager to call the
Inner_Traff ic_C on t roller.
To this point the usual order for invoking the
Segment_Manager functions has not been specified. There is
a usual sequence of events. In order: Create_Segment to
make an Alias_Table entry, i".ake_£nown to introduce the
segment into the address space, and Swap_In to neve the
segment into the process's virtual core are the steps
necessary before a process can make a reference to a
segment. Conversely, Swap_0ut, Terminate, and
Delete_Segment is the order to move a segment from mair.
memory to secondary storage, remove the entry from the KSI
and descriptor from the l"^U, and remove the segment from
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the address space. If the functions are called in any-
other order, the usual result is an error condition and no
action is taken. No 'harm' results from calls made out of
sequence
.
5 . Traffic Controller Module
The Traf
f
ic_Controller is responsible for
multiplexing processes onto virtual processors. A virtual
processor is an abstraction which describes a logical
processor. There are multiple virtual processors which
exist on a single physical processor. The
Traf
f
ic_Controller is also the Kernel module which
supports the interprocess communication primitives, Block
and Wake_Up. In the Archival Storage System, 31ocx and
Wake_Up are the last two of the six user entries into the
Kernel. There are four other procedures in the
Traf ic_Controller which implement the scheduling
algorithm and provide message queue services for Block and
WakeJJp.
a. Active Process Table
The database of the Traf f ic_Controller is the
Active Process Table (APT) (figure 13). This is a
fixed-size table in the Kernel because of the decision not
to create or destroy processes. When the Archival Storage
System goes through system generation, each process will
be created and an entry made in the APT. The process will
then be active for the life of the system. Sach active












> i ... _ J
Figure 13. Active Process Table
58

is also the index to the APT. Note that if processes were
created and destroyed, then allowing Process_IDs to leave
the Kernel could create a communication path. In that case
the Process_ID should be
"
vir tualized" . The State field of
the APT indicates whether a process is blocked, ready, or
running.
An explanation of the interprocess
communication primitives is necessary here. Block and
Wake_Up [19] are the interprocess communication primitives
used by cooperating processes in the Supervisor domain.
Invocation of the primitives is actually a call to the
Traff ic_Controller and causes the Traf
f
ic_Controller to
execute the scheduling algorithm. A process calls Wake_*Jp
when it has a message or task for another process. Wake_Up
will set the state of a blocked process to ready. If the
process is ready or running it will have no effect on the
status of the process. When a process cannot continue
execution until a reply to a Wake_Up is received, the
process must block itself. 31ock will set the process
status to blocked.
Within the Kernel Signal and Wait are the
primitives used for communication. They function in the
same manner as Block and Wake_up, but are calls to the
Inner_Traf
f
ic_Controller instead of the
Traff ic_Controller . Signal and Wait are bounded in time
which indicates that they are guaranteed to return. Block
and Wake_Up are not bounded since no claims can be male
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about correctness of calls from outside the Kernel. It is
possible for a user process to call 31oc* erroneously and
never be heard from again.
The Wake-Up Waiting Switch is Saltzer's [19]
mechanism for synchronization of interprocess
communication primitives. Without the switch a race
condition can occur. For example, the following sequence
of events could happen because processes can run
simul taneously :
1) Process A Looks in its work aueue
and finds it empty.
2) Process 3 puts a task in A's work queue.
3) B wakes up A.
4) A blocks itself.
At step 3, A was running, so the wake-up sent by 3 was
ignored. When A called block, a task is in the work queue,
but A missed the wake-up signal, so the task remains
uncompleted. In particular, if A was expecting some event
necessary for A to continue, A may never wake-up.
The Wake-Up Waiting Switch prevents the
occurrence of such a situation by requiring the following
sequence of actions:
Process B:
1) Process 3 puts task in Process A's
work queue.





1) Reset the wake-up waiting switch to off.
2) Look in the work queue and find it empty
3) Call Block, which returns if wake-up
waiting switch is on.
Now, the above sequences can occur in an/ time
relationship and the wake-up signal will have the desired
effect
.
The Traffic_Controller uses the priority field
for determining what process to schedule to run on the
virtual processor. The Reauired_7irtual_?rocessor field is
used to bind a loaded process to a specific virtual
processor. Only two processes run on a virtual
processor— the loaded process and the "idle" process. This
is a direct result of the simplifying design choice (to
have all processes loaded) made for the Archival Storage
System. In general, processes must he loaded and unloaded.
The Idle process is put into the running state whenever
the loaded process blocks itself.
b. Interprocess Communication Primitives
Eecause the Archival Storage System does not
allow creation or destruction of processes except at
system generation, the only external entry points into the
Traf
f
ic_Controller are Block and Wake_Up. As previously
explained, Block and Wake_Up are the primitives used ty
Supervisor processes for interprocess communication.








If APT [Process_ID] .Wakeup_Wai ting Switch = On
Then APT [Process_IDl .Wakeup_Wai ting Switch := Off
Else APT [?rocess_IDJ .State := Blocked
Sched_Ready Process
PI
?rocess_IL , Message := Get_First_Message( Message_Oueue
)
End 31ock
Figure 14. Block Procedure
62

cannot continue until the occurrence of some other event.
After going through the Sate_Keeper, the call enters the
Traffic_Controller. The Wake_Up_Wait ing_Swi tch is
immediately checked. If the switch is on, the switch is
reset to off, and the first message in the Message_Cueue
for the process is retrieved. The Traf
f
ic_Controller then
returns through the Gate_Keeper
.
If the Wake_0*p_W'aiting_Switch was off then the
state of the process is set to Blocked.
Sched_Ready_Process is called to schedule the highest
priority ready process on the virtual processor. In the
Archival Storage System this is a trivial task, because
the only other process which is loaded on the virtual
processor is the idle process. The idle process can never
block itself, so it must always be either running or




ic_Controller could have been
collapsed into the I nner_Traf
f
ic_C ontroller for this
design, but preservation of generality was a design goal.
Later extensions will be easier to implement since the
basic structure of the Traf fic_Controller is present.
The counterpart of Block is Wake_Up. #ake_'J?
(figure 15) is used by processes in the Supervisor domain
to pass messages to other processes in the Supervisor
domain. Upon entry into Wake_Up, the message is placed in
the Message Queue of the awakened process. The
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cess_Code := Inser t_Message ( Wakeup_Process_ID Message)
Success_Code = Queue_Overf low
f Success_Code = Not_Alloved
n Exit
e APT [Wakeup_?rocess_ID] .Wakeup_Waiting_Switch := On
If APT [tfakeup_Process_II3] .State = Blocked
Then APT [Wakeup_Process_ID] .State := Ready
Enter Ready_Oueue (Wakeup ?rocess_ID)
Pi







Figure 15. Wake-up Procedure
64

Wake_Up_Waiting_Switch of the process to be awakened is
then set to On. Then if the process state is blocked it is
put into the Ready_Queue and the State is set to ready.
Regardless of the state of the awakened process, the
waking process then puts itself into a Read/ State and
Enters the Ready_Queue itself. This is necessary because
the process to be awakened may ha7e a higher priority than
the waking process. Every time either Elock or Vake_Up is
called the scheduling algorithm is executed
(Sched_Ready_Process )
.
c. Process Scheduling Algorithm
Enter_P.eady_Queue (figure 16) and
Sched_Ready_?rocess (figure 17) are two internal functions
of the Traf
f
ic_Controller . En ter_Ready_Queue is used for
placing a ready process into a first-in, first-out queue
which is organized by priority (figure 16). The
Ready_Queue is designed as a two-dimensional array indexed
by Priority and a top and bottom pointer. The algorithms
for all queue operations are taken from Knuth [21]. When a
Process_ID is to be added to the queue the bottom pointer
for the appropriate priority queue is incremented by one.
If the bottom pointer is at the bottom of the linear array
which implements the queue then it is set to the first
location of the array, thus wrapping around. The physical
length of each queue column is equal to the total number
of processes which can be entered into that aueue at any
point in time so that the queue cannot overflow.
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Enter_Ready_Queue Procedure (Process_ID Integer)
Entry
If Ready_Queue_2ottom [APT [Process ID] .Priority] =
Ma x_Queue_ Length
Then Ready_Queue_Bott om [APT [Process_ID] .Priority] :=
Else Ready_Queue~Bottom [APT [Process_ID] .Priori ty] += 1
Fi
Peady_Queue [APT [Process_ID] .Priori ty, Ready_Queue_Bot torn]
:= Process_ID
End Enter_Ready_Queue
Figure 16. Enter_Ready_Queue Procedure
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eady_Queue_Top [Priority] = Max_Queue_Iength
Ready_Queue_Top [Priority] :=
Ready_Queue_Top [Priority] += 1
APT[Ready_Process_ID] .Reqd_7irt_?rocessor
= Processor ID
en APT [Ready_Process_ID] .State := Running














Figure 18. Ready Queue
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Process_ID is placed into the array at the location
pointed to by the bottom pointer. The queue is always
entered at the logical bottom and removal takes place from
the logical top.
The procedure which removes the processes from
the top of the queue is 5ched_Ready_Process . The function
of Sched_Ready_Process is to "pass" (as a baton in a relay
race) the current virtual processor to the highest
priority, ready process which can run on this specific
virtual processor. Starting with the P.ax_?riority queue,
each queue is scanned until the first ready process that
can run on the virtual processor currently executing in
the Traf fic_Controller is encountered. Each aueue is
tested in turn to determine if it is empty. If the queue
is empty, then the next lower priority queue is scanned.
The existence of an Idle process for each virtual
processor guarantees that a ready process is always found,
so the Traf
f
ic_Controller cannot exit without scheduling a
process. When a ready process is found, then the process
State is set to running (scheduled) and the
Inner_Traff ic_Controller is called to SwapJIMU. This
generally will load the process descriptor segments into
the Vir tual_?rocessor_MMU, but in the design of the
Archival Storage System the MMU of the Idle process is
identical to the MMU of the loaded process,
d. Message Cueue Operators















Process ID Process ID
BOTTOM
Figure 19. Message Queue And Pointers
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two-dimensional array of message "frames". It is indexed
in one dimension by the Process_ID and in the other
dimension hy a top and bottom pointer. Insert_Message
(figure 20) is the primitive used "by W'a^e_Up to put a
message into another process' message queue. The design
only allows communication between processes of equal
security class since a Success_Code is returned to the
waking process. Get_?irs t_Message (figure 21) is the
primitive used by Block to retrieve messages from the
message queue. If the queue is empty, the message
"Queue_Empty" is returned.
6 . Non-Discretionary Security Module
The key to implementing a particular
non-discretionary security policy is in one module. By
representing the policy as a partially ordered lattice, an
interpretation algorithm can be written to ma.^e a
comparison between two labels and return a relationship.
The relationship can be equal, less than, greater than, or
not related.
The Non_Discretionary_Securi ty Module shown in
figure 22 will determine the relationship of three
categories of classification (Secret, Confidential,
Unclassified). As shown there are no checks for
compartments (e.g., crypto, nuclear, etc.). If a complete
DOD security policy interpretation is desired, the module
can be expanded. Since some DOD specifications require
provisions for eight categories and sixteen compartments,
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e := Queue_Overf low








Else Success_Code := Not_Alloved
Fi
End Insert_Message
Figure 20. Insert_Message Procedure
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n First_Message := Queue_Empty
e If Message_Queue_Top [Message_Queue_ID] =
Max_Queue_Length
Tnen Message_Queue_Top [Message_Oueue_ID] :=
Else Message_Queue_Top [Message~Queue ID] += 1
Fi




Figure 21. Get_First_Message Procedure
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lassified Then Relationship := Equal
f idential ,Secret Then Relationship
:= Less_Than







lassified Then Relationship := GreaterJTban
fidential Then Relationship := Equal









lassif ied t Conf idential Then
Relationship := G-reater_Than




se Relationship := Not_Related
11
End Non_Eisc_Security
Figure 22. Non_Disc_Securi ty Procedure
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a longword was chosen as the data type for representing
the labels. The 32 hits f a longword are more than
sufficient to represent all possible combinations of
categories and compartments.
Similarly, Privacy Act requirements are easily
implemented in Non_Discretionary_5ecuri ty since they can
be represented by a lattice structure. Most other
practical non-discretionary security policies can be
implemented as well.




multiplexing of virtual processors to the real processor
of the system, ^ach loaded process will be allocated to a
virtual processor, implying that there is a many to one
correspondence. In order to manage these virtual
processors, the Inner_Traf
f
ic_Controller has direct access
to the machine hardware. The Memory Management Unit and
processor state are loaded and unloaded by the
Inner_Traff ic_Controller, thus accomplishing the
multiplexing to the physical processor.
In addition to managing the virtual
processors, the Inner_Traf f ic_Controller furnishes
inter-process services. Signal and Wait are used by
processes in the Kernel ring to communicate with other
Kernel rin^ processes and are primitives of the
Inner_Traff ic_Cont roller .
The main database used to handle the
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Inner_Traff ic_Controller functions is the
Virtual_Processor_Table
. Additionally, a software image of
each MMU is maintained for every loaded process.
a. Virtual Processor Table
The Virtual_Processor_Table (figure 23) is
indexed by the Virtual_Processo r-ID. Each virtual
processor can be in one of three states: 1) Running, 2)
Ready, or 3) Waiting. These three states are analogous to
the state of a process and are used for processor
scheduling in the same manner as the Traf f ic_Gontroller
used the state of a process for scheduling processes.
After the State field is the Signal_Pending_S vitcn which
functions precisely as the Wake_Up_Wai ting_Swi tch for
preventing a race condition from occurring witn the
interprocess communication primitives. Priority is the
next field which is also analogous to the APT priority.
Loc_Processor_State is a pointer to the area
in memory where the MMU software image is maintained as
well as the "save bloc*" for the machine state of the
virtual processor when it is ready or waiting. Figure 24
is an example of the format of the MMU image.
b. Kernel Interprocess Communication Primitives
Signal and Wait function in the same manner as
31ocic and Wa'<ce-Up. The chief distinction between the pairs
is the degree of trust placed on the correctness of use.
Since Signal and Wait are Kernel primitives which are used




































Figure 24. MMU Image
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can be guaranteed to return. The same trust cannot be
placed on the calls to Block: and Wake_Up by processes in
the Supervisor ring. The loop free structure implies that
the Kernel neither knows nor cares what happens in the
outer domain for domains, if present). Yet, the Kernel
must not allow the security state of the machine to change
except in accordance with the rules of the mathematical
model. 31ock is restricted to communication among
processes at the same level. The Kernel must call upon
processes operating at different security levels to
accomplish its task and thus needs a different primitive
since systemwide information is being passed.
With one exception, Signal figure 25) and
Wait (figure 26) function in the same manner as Wake_Up
and Block do in the Traf
f
ic_Controller . Since the data
structures in the Inner_Traf ic_Controller function with
virtual processors, the S ignaled_?rocess_ir or ?rocess_IT
(input parameters) must be translated into a
Signa led_?rocesscr_irJ or Processor_ID . A one-dimensional
table is maintained for this purpose. Because the
Inner_Traf
f
ic_Controller must complete its task before it
returns to the calling procedure and is synchronous to tie
progress of the process, the table translation of process
to virtual processor works. The Idle processes will never
try to Signal or Wait and will never cause the scheduling
algorithm to be executed.
It is oossible for the Idle process to be
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ode := Inser t_Message( Signaled_Processor_ID Message)
s_Code = Queue_Overf low
ess Code = Not Allowed
[Signaled_Processor_IL] .S ignal_Pending_S witch
VPT [Signaled Processor_ID] .S tate = Waiting
n VPT [Signaled_Processor_ID] .State := Ready
En ter_Ready_ Queue (Signaled_?rocessor_ID)















Processor_ID := Map(Process_ID )
If VPT [Processor ID] .Signal Pending Switch = On
Then VPT [?rocessor_ID] .Signal_?ending_S witch := Off
Else VPT [Processor_IDl .State 7= Waiting
Sched Ready_?rocessor
Pi
Signal_Message := Get_First_Sig_Mess(Sig_Cueue[?rocessor_ID] )
End Wait
Figure 26. Wait Procedure
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scheduled on each virtual processor in the storage system.
When that occurs the real processor will cone to a
standstill, executing a Halt instruction. At first glance
this would seem to be an error condition, but in reality
it is not. Since the Archival System is driven 'oy external
events this may at times be a normal state. When a request
is made from a Eost, the interrupt handler (an I/C_m*anager
entry) will Signal (via the Inner_Traffic_Cont roller ) the
appropriate process and cause the scneduling algorithm to
be executed.
c. Service Functions
All of the functions of the
Inner_Traff ic_Controller are called from the Kernel ring.
Add_Seg, Delete_Seg, Load, and Unload are service calls to
support the Segment_Manager . These are hardware dependent
functions and the details of their design will be
influenced by the specific characteristics of the MMO and
CPU hardware. Add_Seg makes an entry into an PMJ hardware
descriptor and also the MMU software image. This call is
made from Make_^nown and will only set up the descriptor.
Since the segment has not been Swapped_Ir. at this point,
the address fields of the descriptor will be null and the
attribute field of the descriptor will be set tc inhibit
the CPU from making access.
Delete_Seg is called from terminate and is
required to remove an entry from the MMU and the software
image. Load will place the absolute location af the
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segment base address into the MMU and change the
attributes to allow the CPU access. Unload removes the
segment base address, inhibits CPU access again and also
retrieves the changed bit from the attribute field. This
changed bit is set when a segment is written and is used
by the Memory_Manager to decide if the segment can be
overwritten or if it must be written back to secondary
storage. A variant of Load and Unload is needed by the
Memory_Manager when doing a local to global move.
Swap_MMU is called from the TrafficJJontroller
and is a result of the scheduling algorithm being
executed. In the general case a process swap would occur
on the virtual processor as a result of this call. In the
Archival Storage System, there are only two processes
which are allowed to run on a virtual processor: 1) the
loaded process or 2) the Idle process. An MMU swap will
still occur conceptually when the idle process is loaied
because it has an MMU image just as any other process.
Actually the idle process's MMU image is exactly the sane
as the loaded process, so a physical swap does not take
place.
Other service calls will be made to tie
InnerJTraff ic_Con troller from the Memory_Manager ani
I/C_Manager but are not detailed here. Software faults, as
discussed in O'Connell and Richardson [5], are net needed
in this design.
S. Memory Manager Module
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The Memory_Manager is a non-distributed Kernel
process and is responsible for managing the real memory
resources of the system. The real memory of the system is
both main memory (random access) and secondary storage
(non-random access). The Memory_Manager could be part of
the distributed Kernel in the Archival Storage System
since it is designed for a single microprocessor; however,
the process abstraction is used to maintain the "family
member" character of the design.
a. Memory Management Scheme
The two main tasks of the Memory_Manager are
to bring segments into memory (In) or remove segments from
memory (Out). Partitioned allocation is the scheme
employed to manage the memory resource. Each loaded
process is given a partition of linear contiguous real
core and is required to manage (via calls to Swap_In and
Swap_0ut ) the partition (its linear virtual core) in any
way it chooses. The Memory_Manager checks each 'In'
request against the process's allocation to insure that
the allocation is not exceeded and to insure that
previously allocated memory is not overlayed.
When a shared segment is not writeable (i.e.,
write permission has not been given to any process^, the
design allows multiple copies (one per process) of the
segment to exist. This frees the Memory_Manager from the
task of moving the segment to "processor global memory,
requesting that all MMU images be updated, and reserves
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global memory for segments which are shared and writeable.
Furthermore, the space that can be saved by having one
copy would not be usable by the processes which are
sharing the segment, since each process's Supervisor would
still have the segment in its virtual core.
If a segment is to be shared and is writeable,
then the Memory_Manager must move it to global memory [5]
.
This insures that all users are sharing the same
information. Again, the actual location of the segment is
invisible to the sharing processes. More memory is
allocated to the segment than it actually uses: viz., one
copy per sharing process. However, the alternative to
using memory is a complex algorithm for dynamically
reconfiguring the mapping of each partition whenever a
shared segment is relocated in memory. The tradeoff of
memory size for complexity is indicated in this
application. Segments are placed in memory within the
appropriate partition at the location specified by the
Supervisor call to Swap_In. A simple bit map lenown as the
Memory_Allocation_Map (figure 27) is used to indicate
which parts of memory are available for use. Each bit of
the map corresponds to a 256-byte page of memory. The ter-n
page is not used here in the classical sense, but is used
to indicate a block: of physical memory. Segments cannot be
divided into pages scattered through core, bat must be
allocated to contiguous memory locations.
The primary database of the Memory_Manager is
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Figure 27. Memory Allocation Map
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the Active_Segment_Table. It provides the Memory_Manager
with the information necessary for managing all segments
in the system which are active.
b. Active Segment Table
There are two sections of the
Active_Segment_Table (AST). That portion of the AST which
contains systemwide information is known as the
Global_Active_5egment_Table (G_AST). Every active segment
in the system will have an entry in the G_AST. The
Memory_Manager also maintains a portion of the AST per
physical processor as the Local_Active_Segment_Table
(L_AST). Only those segments active within the physical
processor will be in the L_AST.
When a segment is *Made_£nown" it becomes
active and will have an entry in the G_AST (figure 29) and
in the appropriate L_AST (figure 29). The concatenation of
the segment's Uniaue_ID and the index to the segment's
entry in the G_AST form the AST3_# which is the 'handle"'
passed by the ^emory_Manager for identifying a specific
active segment. When the Memory_Manager uses the 'handle"
to enter the G_AST, it uses the Sntry_# of the ASTI_*
portion as the index. In the general case (e.g., demand
ac tivati on/deactivat ion) , the Unique_ID of the "handle" is
then compared with the Unique_ID found in the G_AST entry.
If the identification check results in a mismatch, the
G_AST must be searched using the Unique_ID as a <.ey to



































Figure 29. Local Active Segment Table
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"because it is possible that a segment's entry could be
moved in the G_AST before all processes could be notified
of the new AST5_#. If this occurred and a check was not
made, an unauthorized access could then take place. If the
match is successful when first checked, the proper entry
has been found. In this design all known segments for all
processes are active so this problem cannot occur.
Since the G_AST is a systemwide resource a
lock must be used on the G_AST to prevent a race condition
from occurring [11]. The mechanism used in the design is a
locked/unlocked flag. Synchronization on the lock is
inherent in the functioning of the Pemory_Manager 's
Signal_Message_Queue . Note that this mechanism will not
work if the design is extended to include more than one
processor in the system sharing the single S_AST.
The Global_Address field is used only if the
segment is located in global memory. If it is null the
address can be found in the L_AST. The Connected_?rocesses
field is a bit map signifying which processes currently
have the segment active.
The Written flag is used to retain a written
bit when a process Swaps_0ut a segment which is shared and
writeable. For example: Processes A and B are sharin* a
segment and Process A has write permission. A has written
in the segment and now wants to deactivate the segment.
Process B is still using the segment. When A requests the





But since B continues to use the segment,
the Memory_Manager will only reset Process A's flag in the
Connected_Process field. The Written bit is then logically
ORed with the G_AST_Writ ten_Flag. When B then Deactivates
the segment, the Written bit it passes indicates that a
write has not taken place. An error would have occurred if
the Written bit from Process A had not been saved since
the Memory_Manager does not write an unmodified segment
back to secondary storage.
The Writeable flag is set whenever any process
has write access to the segment. This is the key flag for
deciding (at the time activation is requested) if the
segment must be placed in global memory. It cannot
conveniently be used to provide an alternative to the
scenario presented above for Written. Consider that
Processes A, B, and C all have writeable shared access. If
A Deactivates after writing, the Menory_fiana.?er could
write back to secondary storage at that time, (assuming
the proper synchronization was used to prevent B or C from
writing while the transfer took place). Then when 3 or C
Deactivated after writing, another write to secondary
storage would take place. Thus at least one unnecessary
action took place.
The Alias_Table_ASTE_# will be null unless the
segment is a mentor segment. Whenever a mentor segment is
made active its A lias _T able segment is made active at the
same time and will be assigned an ASTS_*. (The Alias_Table
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is a Memory_Manager object. The Alias-Table is actually
implemented as a collection of segments.)
In the general case with demand
activation/deactivation, the #_Entries_Active is a field
which is used for Alias_Table entries only. An Alias_Table
segment must remain active as long as any of its entries
are active, although it need not remain in main memory.
The #_Entries_Active is a counter which is incremented any
time an Alias_Table Entry is activated and decremented
when an Alias_Table Entry is deactivated. Thus the
Alias_Table frame can be deactivated only when the
Connected_Processor map of the mentor segment and the
#_Entries_Active both become zero or null. (Note that the
Connected Processor Map of the Alias_Table segment will
always show only the physical processors wnose
Memory_Manager has the Alias_Table in its address space.)
In this design all known segments are active so these
explicit checks upon deactivation are not required.
The remaining field of the G_AST is the
Page_Table_Address . The Page_Table_Address is the location
in secondary storage of the page table. The ?age table in
turn provides the location of the segment.
The L_AST portion of the AST is maintained per
physical processor and should not be confused with a
distributed data structure since the L_AST is
Memory_Manager data structure and not part of
distributed Kernel. It is searched by Virtual_?rocessor_ID
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and segment Uniaue_ID. The remaining four fields are
Access, Absolute_Address , Size, and Sesment_#. The Access
is the read or read/write access of the segment available
for use in moving between local and global memory. The
Absolute_Address is the location of the segment in main
memory. If Absolute_Address is null, the segment is on
secondary storage and has not been moved to main memory.
c. Aliasing Scheme
The Memory_Manager also provides the aliasing
service for the system. Each segment which exists in the
Archival Storage System has a Unique_ID. This Unique_ID is
an integer which uniauely identifies each segment. It is
chosen from a large list of integers. Since the data type
is a longword, the list contains more than four billion
unique integers. To prevent a communication path from
existing when a segment identification must be passed out
of the Kernel, an alias is provided which virtualizes the
Unique_ID. When a process wishes to create a new segment,
it must pass the Kernel a Mentor_Segment_* and a desired
Sntry_#. The mentor segment can be any segment the
Supervisor wishes, but an entry for the mentor must be in
the Known_Segment_Table of the process. The
Segment_Manager then loo»cs up the ASTE_* of the segment
and Signals the Memory_Manager with the ASTE_* and
Entry_#. The Memory_Manager maintains a fiat file system
known as the Alias_Table (figure 30) which is systemvide.















Figure 30. Alias Table
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the Alias_Table. When the Memory_Manager receives a Signal
which requires use of the Alias_Table, the Memory_^anager
brings the appropriate Alias_Table segment into memory.
The Entry_# is then used as an index into the Alias_Table
where the Memory_Mana*er can determine the Unique_ID and
physical attributes of the indexed segment. A segment
exists for each entry in the Alias_Table.
The attributes found in the Alias_Table are
the segment Size, the location of its secondary storage
Page_Table, the segment Access_Class, and the secondary
storage page table of its Alias_Table segment if it is a
mentor segment. AliasJTable storage is allocated when the
first reauest for an Alias_Table entry is made, and is
deallocated whenever the segment is empty. The
Memory_Manager will not honor a request to delete a
segment if it has an Alias_Table segment. If this deletion
were allowed, storage space would be lost forever since
the Alias_Table segment of the mentor segment and any
segments referred to by that Alias_Table segment would not
be recovered.
d. Storage Allocation
The Memory_Manager is responsible for
controlling storage media as well as main memory. The
storage hardware for this design is anticipated to be a
type of hard disk: using the Winchester technology.
However, the design may be initially implemented on an
eight-inch "floppy" disk drive using the IBM standard.
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single density format. Using this standard, a single disk
has 77 tracks of 26 sectors each available for storage.
Each sector stores 128 bytes of information.
Since the Z8000 hardware allows segment sizes
in multiples of 256 bytes, it is convenient to establish a
"page" size as 256 bytes. Using this scheme, a page can
then be stored in two sectors of the disk. A page then
becomes convenient as the size of a page table. The page
table is used to record the location of each page of the
segment on the disk. If the location of each page is
stored in unpacked form, a total of 128 page locations can
be stored in a page. Note, however, that this scheme uses
only 11 of the 16 bits which can contain information (7
bits for the track index, and 4 for the sector index), and
can easily be reduced to 10 bits since every other sector
is not explicitly indexed. This means that 1024 pages can
be addressed by one page of a ?age_Table and is adeauate
to store the maximum size segment (256 pages) allowed by
the Z8000 hardware.
A free page bit map is needed in order to
record which pa^es on the disk are available and which are
allocated. This will also reauire one page on the disk.
This scheme allows the disk space to be allocated to
segments from the "free list" and does not require complex
compaction algorithms. If other forms of storage media are
used they can be easily adapted to this scheme.
9. Input_Output Manager Module
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The I/C_Manager is the non-distributed Kernel
process which is concerned with moving information across
the boundaries of the Archival Storage System. It manages
the input and output ports of the system as a resource in
much the same way as the Memory_Manager handled the memory
resource. The I/0_Manager would use an Attach_Table to
virtualize the system ports. While the I/0_Manager is a
process in the general case, it can be designed and




. CONCLUSION AND FOLLOW ON WORK
The detailed design of the Security Kernel for a data
warehouse has teen presented. This design is suitable for
implementation on a Zilog Z9000 microprocessor-based
system. A minimal subset of a family of secure operating
systems has been demonstrated to exist and can be
implemented on microprocessor hardware which is available
today. This design also shows the feasibility of an
Archival Storage System that can be the nucleus of a
distributed, multi-microprocessor computer system by
providing archival storage with multilevel security.
The design illustrates the utility of modern software
engineering techniques. A loop-free structure was
maintained as a design goal, preserving the ability to
modify a module without introducing change in any other
module. An explicit process structure simplifies the
design for asynchronous functions. Functionality of this
family member can be extended by including additional
primitives from the larger set of primitives described by
O'Connell and Richardson [5]
.
Security of information was a primary goal throughout
the design process. A mathematical model was used as a
foundation for the Kernel to insure properly designed
security. A multilevel security capability is included for
the storage system. Furthermore, on this base a complete,
rrultilevel secure, distributed "system" can be constructed




While designed for a single microprocessor with memory
management unit support, the structure of the hi*h level
design which allows configuration independence was
preserved. The same concepts for reducing bus contention
in a multiprocessor system while providing data sharing
were used and can he easily extended, e.g., for increased
processing capacity to serve a large number of higher
bandwidth hosts .
Implementation of the Archival Storage System is an
area for further work. The distributed Kernel data
structures and procedures are described in this thesis.
Additional effort will produce compilable implementation
code and from this code generate a loadable system. The
Kernel non-distributed processes for I/C and physical
memory management have been briefly presented and more
detailed design will be needed prior to implementation.
The Archival Storage System design is a minimal family
member. Additional services to the Supervisor and
generalization of the simplifying assumptions (e. g., to
interface to multilevel hosts) are major areas where
continued research is indicated.
After implementation of the storage system,
substantial work is necessary in performance evaluation.
Hardware choices have been primarily left
implementor. Since many of the software ie^
imolications on efficiency are unknown at the present
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time, fine-tuning of both hardware and software will
result in better system performance.
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APPENDIX A - GATE KEEPER LISTING
Gate_£eeper Procedure
Type











: = [[«Traff i c_C on
t
roller >>Blccic"En try , 1] ,
[<<Traff ic_Controller>>Wake_Up_Entry,3]
,
[<<Seg:nent_Manager>>Creat e_Entrv f 5] ,
[<<Segment_Manager>>Delete_Sntry ,3]
,








DI NVI,VI fDisable interrupts!


















EI NVI,VI lEnables interrupts!
VALIDATE: DO JCheck location of arguments for user
read/write access!






I? NE THEN EXIT FROM VALIDATE IRetum if invalid!





MOVE_STACK: DO !Move argument list to Kernel work: space!
CPB RH0,#0
IF EQ THEN POP R4,GRR2
PUSH 0RR14.R4
D*C RH0
ELSE EXIT FROM MOVE_STACK
FI
REPEAT FROM MOVE_STACK ILooo until all -roved!
OD
CALL FUNCTION: DO
LD FUNCTION_CODE,(?RR14(#24) IRetrieved from system call
instruction on system Stack 1
LD R6, MAX FUNCTION CODE
C? R6,FUNCTIGN_CCDE
IF GT TEEN LD LDL RR10,«DIST KERNEL ID>>MESS.».GZ POINTER
LD R2JNVALID FUNCTION CODE
LD @RR10(0) t R2 !?ut~error code into message!
EXIT FROM CALL_FUNCTION
ELSE LD R6,0RR2( NUMBER OF ARGUMENTS)
! Check number of oarameters!
CP R6,FUNCTI0N_TA3LE[FUNCTI0N CODE , NO OF ARGUMENTS]
IF EQ T^EN CALL FUNCTION TABLE [FUNCTION_CODE .FUNCTION
ELSE LDL RR10,<<DI3T_KERNEL_ID>>MESSAGZ_?C:MTER





OD !END OF CALL FUNCTION LOOP!
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LDB RH1, INDEX !Zero out user argument list!
ZERO_OUT: DO
CP RH1,#0
IF NE THEN POP R2,0RR14
EEC RH1








MOVE_RET_MSG: DO !Put message back in user area!
CP RH1,#0








OD !END OF VALIDATE!
DI NMI,VI IDisable interrupts!
















POP Rl f GRR14
POP R0.0RR14
EI MMI,VI lEnable interrupts!
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